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Abstract
In their editorial, Speed and Mannion identify two main challenges “the rise of post-truth populism” poses 
for health policy: the populist threat to inclusive healthcare policies, and the populist threat to well-designed 
health policies that draw on professional expertise and research evidence. This short comment suggests some 
conceptual clarifications that might help in thinking through more profoundly these two important issues. It 
argues that we should approach right-wing populism as a combination of a populist down/up (people/elite) axis 
with an exclusionary nationalist in/out (member/non-member) axis. And it raises some questions regarding the 
equation between populism, demagogy and the rejection of expertise and scientific knowledge.
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Populism has been a hot topic for many years now. It has served as one of the main interpretive frameworks for understanding a wide range of political phenomena: 
European populist radical right parties like the French Front 
National, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and other left-wing 
leaders in Latin America, European left-wing anti-austerity 
movements such as the Greek SYRIZA and the Spanish 
PODEMOS, the Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom, 
and most recently, Donald Trump’s rise to power. Whilst 
of earlier coinage and certainly not denoting an entirely 
new phenomenon, the term ‘post-truth politics’ has gained 
prominence more recently in the context of Trump’s election 
campaign and presidential communication strategies. 
Speed and Mannion’s editorial reflects on the challenges 
of “the rise of post-truth populism” for health policy.1 Two 
such challenges are central to their argument: the populist 
threat to inclusive and accessible healthcare policies, and the 
populist threat to well-designed health policies that draw 
on professional expertise and research evidence. These are 
matters of major significance indeed. I certainly do not have 
the expertise to evaluate the impact of populist politics on 
health policy, and I can only agree with Speed and Mannion’s 
warnings about the dangers for health policies posed by 
populist politicians such as Donald Trump or right-wing 
Brexiteers. My aim in this piece is to suggest some conceptual 
clarifications that, I hope, might help in thinking through 
more profoundly these two important questions about the 
relations between populist politics and health policy. 
Populism, Nationalism, Exclusion
Populism, Speed and Mannion argue, undermines the 
principle of universal healthcare. From Trump’s anti-Mexican 
rhetoric to the rejection of Easter-European immigrants and 
Syrian refugees in the Brexit debate, they write, populism 
“discriminates against certain sub-sections of the population 
and exacerbates existing national (and global) health 
inequalities.” Moreover, they argue, populists’ nationalist 
protectionism threatens the benefits for healthcare of 
“international cooperation and agreements that allow the free 
flow of people, capital, goods and information.”
These arguments echo a more general and very common view 
of populism as inherently opposed to national outgroups 
and globalisation. In fact, Speed and Mannion’s theorization 
of populism does not make the mistake of conflating 
populism with xenophobia or the radical right, characteristic 
of European analyses of populism especially.2 Drawing on 
the work of Laclau, Weyland, and Mudde, they stress that 
populist politics revolves around the antagonism between ‘the 
people’ and ‘the elite.’ “Populism,” they write, “concerns only 
the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, 
who is considered to be the elite or the people, depends on the 
political orientation of the populist.” Populism, therefore, is 
“neither ostensibly of the right, middle or the left.” Drawing 
on the conceptualization of populism as a ‘thin ideology,’ 
mainly associated with the work of Cas Mudde,3 they argue 
that “this ideology can be appended to a range of “thick” 
ideologies with more mature political logics such as socialism 
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and nationalism.”
However, as a consequence of their focus on right-wing 
populists such as Trump and the UK Independence Party 
they then go on to treat populism as inherently nationalist, 
xenophobic or even racist. For example, they argue that “[p]
opulism […] is concerned with national protectionism which 
limits international cooperation and movement,” which the 
authors consider to threaten advancements in healthcare. 
Later on they write that “[t]here are clear parallels with the 
events in Europe in the 1930s, with populist claims of putting 
the people first, while promoting division and turning people 
against one another.”
Right-wing populists like UKIP, Trump or the Front National 
are most certainly nationalist and exclusionary. However, 
these are not an inherent feature of populism, as Speed and 
Mannion themselves indicate in their conceptualization 
of populism. A more consistent focus on how populism, is 
combined with different ideologies, and used to further those 
ideologies, allows us to better grasp the potential threats 
populism poses to a broadly accessible healthcare system. 
For one, the welfare chauvinism of populist (radical) right 
politics that undermines universal access to healthcare 
and other welfare provisions, is structured by the ethnic-
cultural in/out (member/non-member) nativist dimension 
of their politics, not by the populist down/up (people/elite) 
dimension in itself.4,5 And the backlash against birth control 
services or forms of sexual orientation discrimination Speed 
and Mannion mention, are not inherent to populism either, 
but to the programmes of the (radical) right. If we aim to 
grasp the challenges (radical) right-wing populist politics 
pose for health policy we need to think carefully about which 
dimensions of these politics threaten universal and accessible 
healthcare provisions and in what ways. Populist strategies 
have certainly contributed significantly to strengthening the 
appeal of nativist and radical right politics beyond a core of 
traditional radical right-wing activists and voters, but the 
threat posed by such parties cannot be grasped through the 
term populism alone. Using ‘populism’ as shorthand for these 
kinds of politics might actually shift our attention away from 
what really matters to these parties (exclusionary nationalism) 
and from how they really threaten solidarity and democracy 
(by excluding refugees, migrants, people of foreign descent). 
Instead, we need to ask how the populist down/up (people/
elite) axis and the nationalist in/out (member/non-member) 
axis are articulated in right-wing exclusionary populisms, 
and combined with other elements of radical right-wing 
programmes.
Secondly, populist politics are not necessarily nationalist, and 
certainly not necessarily xenophobic. Bolivia’s Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, US Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, or Spain’s 
PODEMOS are certainly populist. But if anything their 
politics have been about the inclusion of marginalised ethnic 
groups, rather than their exclusion. Moreover, in this kind 
of left-wing populisms, the populist strategy of claiming to 
represent ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ is used to formulate 
demands for solidarity, for more equitable and universal access 
to welfare provisions. This happens through the formulation 
of a broader and more exclusive definition of ‘the people,’ that 
unlike on the right, is not limited to the nation, defined in 
an exclusionary ethnic-cultural way.6 Such left-wing populist 
movements, therefore, can use populism to demand and 
implement, in the name of ‘the people,’ more inclusive and 
accessible health care provisions; think for example about 
the significant investments in health care in Venezuela under 
Hugo Chávez or about Bolivia’s Evo Morales’ promises of 
free healthcare for all. Left-wing populists can formulate 
their criticism of neoliberal privatisation of or austerity 
measures in healthcare in populists terms, accusing the ‘the 
elite’ of betraying ‘the people’ and serving its own interest 
by privatising health care provision (the NHS, for example), 
whilst demanding the (re)nationalisation of healthcare in the 
name of ‘the people.’
The relation between populism and inclusion and exclusion 
from healthcare and other welfare provisions is therefore less 
straightforward than the almost completely negative picture 
Speed and Mannion draw as a consequence of their empirical 
focus on Trump and Brexit. As Speed and Mannion’s own 
theoretical framework suggests, we can only grasp the 
potential threats and potentials of populist politics for health 
policy by looking at the interconnection of populism with 
other components of these politics, “such as socialism and 
nationalism.”
Populism, Expertise and “Post-truth”
A second challenge of ‘post-truth populism’ for health policy, 
according to Speed and Mannion, lies in populism’s rejection 
of expertise and scientific knowledge. Populism, they write, 
threatens “good [health] policy design” because “populist 
policies tend to be shaped more by the personal whims and 
prejudices of a demagogue than underpinned by a secure 
evidence base.” Moreover, populists also practice ‘post-truth’ 
politics to attract voters: “Populist politicians’ reliance on 
assertions that appear true, but have no basis in fact, creates a 
false view of the world, not with the intention of convincing 
the elites that they are right, but in reinforcing prejudices 
among their targeted pool of potential supporters.” 
Whereas the inclusionary or exclusionary nature of different 
kinds of populist politics depends almost entirely on 
components other than populism, the down/up, people versus 
elite antagonism inherent to populism does indeed lend itself 
very well to a celebration of ordinary people’s opinions. And 
it is easily used to delegitimize experts as members of an ‘elite’ 
that is out of touch with ordinary people and that does not 
serve their interests. 
I would like to suggest some conceptual precisions that 
might help us to analyse and evaluate populists’ relationship 
with expertise, knowledge, factuality and demagogy more 
thoroughly. It seems useful here to distinguish between 
the use of expertise in policy design, and expert-led 
technocratic decision-making; that is, between the use of 
expertise in designing policies that pursue aims decided on 
through democratic procedures, and experts setting policy 
priorities.
On the first level, the questions are: Do populist politicians use 
expertise to formulate their policy proposals? Do they, once in 
power, draw on scientific experts and professional civil service 
to achieve the policy goals they have formulated? Or is there 
something inherently anti-expertise in populist politics? How 
we define populism is important here. If we define populism 
as a thin ideology that revolves around the belief in a ‘pure 
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people’ and ‘a corrupt elite’ and the formulation of policies 
based on that belief,7 then populism would indeed tend to 
anti-expert positions. However, if we, as I would prefer, stress 
populism’s strategic rather than ideological nature and see 
populism as a particular political logic – a particular way of 
formulating demands as based in ‘the people,’ of interpellating 
citizens as members of the people-as-underdog, and of 
criticising opponents as an illegitimate ‘elite’8,9 – then populism 
does not necessarily entail distrust for expert knowledge 
per se. Not unlike other politicians, populists are likely to 
draw on the expertise that suits their aims and to disregard 
expertise that does not. At the same time, the populist logic 
does revolve around the celebration of ‘the people,’ and it is 
particularly suitable to the anti-intellectualist delegitimation 
of expertise that does not fit a particular populist party’s 
goals as ‘elitist’ and ‘far removed from the people.’ Whilst not 
a necessary characteristic of populism, it is certainly worth 
researching whether “populist policies tend to be shaped 
more by the personal whims and prejudices of a demagogue 
than underpinned by a secure evidence base,” as Speed and 
Mannion suggest. If this is the case, this definitely holds risks 
for well-designed health policy as “the disdain for policy 
experts by politicians pursuing populist policies, may result 
in poorly designed and implemented health policies with 
potentially seriously dysfunctional consequences.” 
The latter argument can also be read on a second level, 
however, where the populist “disdain for policy experts” starts 
to mean something else, and where the critique of populism 
itself risks to become democratically problematic. A second 
level of the analysis between populists and experts might 
indeed revolve around the question: Who should determine 
policy goals and on what basis? Should experts determine 
policy goals or should the electorate? And if the latter, how 
directly and through what channels? And also: Should the 
electorate base its political choices on expertise? Populist 
politicians have criticised technocratic decision-making 
as undemocratic for not taking into account the opinions 
of the people. Populist politics, as Speed and Mannion also 
write, have been described by many as a correction to and 
consequence of the move of decision-making power away 
from ordinary citizens and directly elected representatives 
to supra-national bodies, technocrats, as well as away from 
democratic politics to the private sector.10-12 This diagnosis of 
populism links up with broader criticisms of what has been 
called our ‘post-democratic’13 or ‘post-political’ situation. 
Political theorists such as Chantal Mouffe14,15 and Jacques 
Rancière16 have formulated critiques of technocratic and 
consensual politics that, they argue, deny the properly 
‘political’ moment of decision-making: the moment of struggle 
between differing opinions and interests. By presenting what 
are fundamentally political decisions as mere technical policy 
issues, Mouffe and others argue, technocratic ‘center’ politics 
hide their own political nature behind a veil of objectivity, 
neutrality, and value-free expertise. Simultaneously, these 
supposedly value-free and rational decisions are opposed to 
the supposedly irrational and emotional whims of the people, 
and to the populist politics that supposedly play to people’s 
prejudices and ignorance. This is where the longstanding 
dismissal of populist politics as playing to the underbellies 
of ordinary people (rather than their brains) and the recently 
more prominent critique of ‘post-truth’ come together. 
Post-truth, Speed and Mannion cite the Oxford dictionary 
“relates to or denotes circumstances in which objective facts 
are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals 
to emotion and personal belief.” Certain kinds of populist 
politics exploit and strengthen prejudice and ignorance 
among parts of the population, and some of them do through 
lies and deceitful propaganda (Trump and parts of the Brexit 
campaign are good examples indeed). We should be careful 
not to equate populism with demagogy or ‘post-truth politics,’ 
however. The populist pitting of the people against the elite 
is not necessarily demagogic or dishonest (and can even be 
used to oppose demagogic and dishonest politics). Moreover, 
the critique of ‘post-truth populist politics’ can lead us to a 
problematic delegitimization of ‘the people’ as led by emotions 
rather than well-informed opinions. The idea that “objective 
facts” (should) shape public opinion – implied in the Oxford 
definition of post-truth for example – also loses sight of the 
unavoidable emotional and affective elements of all kinds of 
politics, from Left to Right, from inclusionary to exclusionary, 
from communist to neoliberal, and from populist to anti-
populist. Furthermore, we should be careful not to treat 
the knowledge produced by experts as value-free or neutral 
(as opposed to non-neutral political views). Indeed, expert 
knowledge can, and has, been used to strengthen the welfare 
state as well as to undermine its legitimacy and replace the 
institutions of the welfare state with profit-driven market 
structures.
Conclusion
It looks as if populist political parties and leaders are not 
likely to retreat from the front stage anytime soon. The 
concept of populism is absolutely crucial in furthering our 
understanding of the political strategies and popular appeal 
of populists on the Left and the Right, from PODEMOS to 
the Front National and from Sanders to Trump. We need 
to continue to investigate the threats populist politics pose 
to democratic politics and just societies, as Speed and 
Mannion argue. But we also need to consider the potentials 
they might offer for a more democratic and more inclusive 
politics. In drawing on a conceptualization of populism as 
revolving around a people versus elite antagonism, Speed and 
Mannion’s piece starts from a sound basis for the analysis of 
the threats and potentials of populist politics for an equitable 
health policy, and points out a number of crucial challenges of 
right-wing exclusionary ‘post-truth’ populism poses to health 
policy. Such an analysis would also benefit, I have suggested 
in this text, from a more rigorous restriction of the concept of 
populism to that people/elite dimension. 
The term populism has great analytical potential, but it never 
suffices to cover the entire politics of any populist party, leader 
or movement. To grasp how populist politics of the nationalist 
and xenophobic kind might impact on health policy, we need 
to look at the articulation of populism with nationalism 
and xenophobia, and at how populist strategies legitimise 
nationalist and xenophobic exclusion. Similarly, to probe 
the consequences of ‘post-truth populism’ for health policy, 
we need to ask how certain populists connect the people-
elite antagonism with a ‘post-truth’ disregard of factuality 
and a delegitimation of expertise. I hope the conceptual 
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clarifications I have suggested in this brief contribution might 
prove of use in in thinking through the issues of major societal 
importance raised by Speed and Mannion.
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